Perception of the threat of War in Israel- implications for future preparedness planning

The purpose of this study was to explore the perception of the threat of war by the
Israeli public. The motivation behind the research arises from evidence provided by
the literature for association between the perception of threat and preparedness behavior
13]–19]. However, this does not seem to be the case with the Israeli population, at least
not for the war scenario. In a recent publication based on the same database presented
in this paper, it was demonstrated that the Israeli public did not exhibit the correlation
reported in the literature between perception of threat and preparedness, but for
one exception concerning the perceived severity of impact on the family’s routine
12]. Given this seeming disparity between the threat perception components and the preparedness
behavior, one could argue that there is no reason to further explore the perception
of threat by the Israeli public because no meaningful conclusions can be drawn for
policymaking. Yet, as the findings of this study suggest, there is much to be learned
from the analysis of the perception of threat by the Israeli public concerning better
approaches to promote public resilience.

It is interesting to note that the Israeli public demonstrates unique patterns of
threat perception, when compared to those reported for other populations. On the one
hand, Israelis tend to estimate the likelihood of war in the near future as low. In
actuality, this assessment turned to be false with the eruption of the July 2014 operation
in Gaza, less than a year following our telephone-based survey. On the other hand,
Israelis tend to estimate the severity of the threat as high, with more than half
of the sample anticipating severe outcomes for themselves, their family members and
their properties. For both variables, i.e., the perception of likelihood and the perception
of severity, younger people tend to have a more pessimistic view of the threat. Nevertheless,
explaining this phenomenon by “young and afraid” simply cannot cut it because the
data also suggest a complimentary trend, according to which the more experienced a
person is with the threat, the more he or she perceives it as a threat. This is demonstrated
through the higher rates of the perception of severity among native-born Israelis,
and the higher threat intrusiveness among residents of regions affected by prior conflicts;
both represent groups that endured the threat for longer extents than their counterparts
did.

The above hypothesis regarding the unique characteristics of the Israeli public’s
perception of threat is supported by findings reported by Lahad, Shcham Shcham (2009)
29], who have examined the Jewish and Arab population in northern Israel following the
Second Lebanon War. The authors concluded that communities enduring persisting hardship
such as war and terrorism, have less faith in authorities’ capabilities to support
preparedness and are less likely to anticipate retrieval of normalcy to their everyday
lives. Mistrust in authorities was already reported as counterproductive to individual
preparedness behavior 30].

Perhaps, one of the most important findings of this research emerges from the changes
observed in the patterns of threat perception by the Israeli public in recent years.
In 2005, Kirschenbaum noted that 66 % of his then studied sample of the Israeli public
reported perceiving a medium to high chance of war occurring in Israel in the “near
future.” 17] However, less than a decade later, we observed a reduction in the likelihood perception
with only 49 % of the current sample reporting similar likelihood rates (in adjusted
scales). According to the Chi-square test (?
²
?=?48.081, df?=?2, p??.001), this difference is statistically significant. In line with the Chi-square
test (?
²
?=?5.95, df?=?1, p?=?.015), threat intrusiveness rates reported in the current study (33 %) were significantly
lower than those reported by Kirchenbaum in 2005 (44 %). The data suggest that the
Israeli public, post the Second Lebanon War (2006) and the Gaza conflicts of 2009
and 2012 perceives the probabilities of war and being affected by it as diminished.
Attempting to generalize this conclusion, these results suggest that kept under constant
reminder of a threat, a given population might develop apathy or indifference toward
it.

We suggest that the reduction in threat intrusiveness can be explained as the result
of habituation to armed conflicts, a process in which the Israeli public is desensitized
to the threat by observing a relatively small toll on Israeli lives. A similar notion was proposed by Dov Waxman (2011) for
terrorism 31]. This phenomenon is backed in numbers. According to official data 32]–34]: (a) during the 33 days of the Second Lebanon War (2006), 41 civilians died and 2000
were injured. Approximately 4000 rockets were fired at the northern part of the country,
thus, generating a death rate of one person per 100 rockets; (b) during the 22 days
of operation “Cast Lead” (2009) in Gaza, three civilians were killed and 183 were
injured as a result of the 536 rockets fired during this conflict – a death rate of
0.6 persons per 100 rockets; (c) in the eight days of operation “Pillar of Defense”
(2012) in Gaza, 4 civilians were killed and 241 injured as a result of the 1264 rockets
not intercepted by the “Iron Dome” missile defense system. This constitutes a death
rate of 0.3 persons per 100 rockets. A similar trend can be observed in the rates
of injured persons. Although not relevant for the data reported in this study performed
in 2013, the trend continues for the 2014 Gaza conflict, in which the death rate dropped
to 0.14 persons per 100 rockets not intercepted.

The data provided above suggest that the Israeli public, possibly reassured by a technological
advancement in the defense arena (e.g., the “Iron Dome” missile defense system), have
grown accustomed to the threat of high-trajectory weapons, and perceive them less-and-less
as a personal risk. Yet, this should also be considered for its backfiring potential,
since the same apathy can lead people to place themselves in harm’s way instead of
following lifesaving instructions. This phenomenon was already observed during the
2009, 2012, and 2014 Gaza conflicts, in which civilians were either killed or injured
because of their disregard or non-adherence to emergency behavior instructions issued
by the civil defense authority.

While the reduction in threat intrusiveness since 2005 might be explained by the habituation
effect, it is much more difficult to provide an explanation for the parallel reduction
in the perception of the likelihood of the threat. This issue is further complicated
in light of the tendency to expect the worst out of the war scenario, as demonstrated
in the severity perception data. The findings here seem to be conflicting. On the
one hand, the majority of Israelis do not foresee a looming war in the near future;
however, they also hold a grave perception of the outcomes of such war if it indeed
occurred. In order to explain the reduced rates of likelihood perception, one should
first explain the findings of the severity perception.

This study suggests that the Israeli public is anticipating severe outcomes of a war
taking place in Israel in all layers of its societal fabric, including the impact
on the family’s routine. Despite enduring this threat for decades, the notion of war
remains intimidating to most Israelis. It is therefore not surprising that responders
tend to alienate themselves from the risk. Responders in our survey increasingly refused
to answer items as they became more specific to their personal well-being. Potentially,
this could be explained as a basic mechanism of denial, and could account for much
of the findings presented in this paper: a perception of a severe threat may lead
to denial-based coping mechanisms that are exhibited in a reduced perception of likelihood.
This serves to further illustrate the difficulty in motivating the public to engage
in preparedness behavior. In this context, it is also interesting to note that people
residing in areas affected by armed conflict up to 2013, i.e., the north or south
of Israel, are also less keen on assuming personal responsibility for preparedness
behavior. This finding suits the suggested explanation that repeated experience with
the threat could be counterproductive in promoting individual motivation for an engagement
in preparedness behavior.

The findings of this study suggest that the association reported in the literature
between the perception of threat and preparedness behavior is probably mediated by
other factors, which are yet to be fully identified. A similar notion was proposed
by Rüstemli and Karanci (2010), who examined the preparedness behavior among earthquake-victimized
population in Turkey 35]. The authors conclude there:

These results suggest that protective behavior in victimized populations is determined
essentially by fear and belief in personal control rather than severity of prior experience
and cognition related to the perceived severity and occurrence of future hazards. (p. 99)

Implications for policymaking

In a separate publication 12] based on the same database examined in this paper, we reported correlates of preparedness
behavior in the Israeli public. It was reported that 15.4 % of the variance in preparedness
behavior, i.e., the public’s compliance rate with the civil defense recommendations,
can be explained by place of birth, place of residence, sense of preparedness, willingness
to search for information, and the perceived severity of impact on a family’s routine.
Out of these five predictors, only the last two can be considered as targets for potential
intervention policies.

In this current study, it is demonstrated that the perceived severity of impact on
a family’s routine could be predicted through levels of income and education (for
native-born Israelis). However, it should be noted that our previous study reported
a negative correlation between severity perception and preparedness behavior 12]. Since we cannot and do not wish to propose to promote public resilience by increasing
the severity perception at the expense of reducing literacy rates or income, we cannot
offer a meaningful recommendation on this aspect.

Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from examining the data around the willingness
to search for information. Other publications support the beneficial attributes of
willingness to search for information 15], 26], 36], 37]. More recently, a national survey performed by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Authority (FEMA) in 2012 found that information aware respondents were more likely
than unaware respondents to report that they had updated their supplies and had a
household emergency plan 38]. In this current study, the regression analysis suggests that this preparedness-promoting
factor can be predicted by several socio-demographic variables, but also by perceptions
of likelihood and severity. In fact, severity perception to oneself and family members
was the most predictive factor of willingness to search for information (??=?0.309).
In the face of it, this seems to contradict the previously reported negative effect
observed for severity perception on preparedness behavior 12], because it suggests that having a graver perception of threat outcomes can lead
to information seeking, which is predicted to increase engagement in preparedness
behavior. Since the negative correlation reported between severity perception and
preparedness 12] did not point out which is the cause and which is the effect, the latest findings
reported in this study suggest that increased preparedness leads to a decrease in
severity perception, almost certainly due to a heightened sense of preparedness. A
full picture can now be proposed – increased severity perception of the threat to
oneself and family members promotes information seeking, which is expected to result
in actual preparedness behavior. Once this behavior is performed, the individual appraisal
of increased familial preparedness leads to a sense of preparedness that decreases
the perceived severity of impact on a family’s routine. These findings suggest that
a possible target for risk communication strategies should be promoting individual
assessment of personal and kin risk prior to and following preparedness behavior.

Lastly, investing in the promotion of public resilience to emergency can translate
into reduced demands for healthcare in the aftermath of a crisis. This is probably
true for the provision of both medical healthcare and mental healthcare. Drawing support
from the literature in the field 2], 3], 7], 8], we conclude that a more resilient Israeli public will be able to better cope in
the face of adversity. Policy makers should therefore regard the promotion of resilience
as an additional means of promoting public health through preventive measures.